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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
N. B. ROGERS HELMAN, forinerly
known and being one and the same
person as N. B. Rogers,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

Case No.
7552

W. C. P XTERSON, ASA LL.OYD
HEFLIN, MEL.VIN C. BO·WL·E:S,
FIRST DOE, SECOND D'OE,
THIRD DOE, and FOURTH DOE,
Defendavnts and Appellant·s.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMEN:T OF F AC·Ts
Plaintiff commenced this proceeding to quiet title
to an undivided one-half interest in certain unpatented
mining claims situate in San Juan County, Utah, and
more particularly described in the Plaintiff's Complaint.
The Comp~laint further alleged that the Defendant has
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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entered upon said mining :claims, mined ore therefrom,
and the prayer of the ·Complaint, inter alia, asks for
injunctive relief. However, no damages were asked for,
and no restraining order was ever issued and no further
reference will be made to this phase of the case. (R.
37-58)
The defendant, W. C. Paterson, filed an answer in
which he admitted that said mining claims were recorded
as alleged, that he claimed an interest in said mining
claims adverse to the claims of the Plaintiff and denied
each and every other allegation of the Complaint. The
De~endant's answer alleged as. an .affirmative defense
and cross-complaint that he was the sole owner of the
le~gal and possessary title to said mining claims and
entitle9. to the possession thereof, subject only to a leasehold interest of the Defendants, Heflin and Bowles. (R.
32-34)
The answer further alleged that on May 21, 1949, the
D·e.fendant entered into- an option agreement with the
Plaintiff under the terms of which the Defendant offered
to sell some of the mining claims desc'ribed in the Plaintiff's Complaint, but said agreement was never exer:cised,
consumated or fulfilled, and that on October 4, 1949, the
Plaintiff and the Defendant entered into an agreement
under the terms of which the Plaintiff agreed to buy and
the Defendant agreed to sell all of the mining claims
described in the Complaint for the sum of $25,000.00, that
the Plaintiff failed to make payments as provided in
said agreement and the Defendant has ·cancelled said
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3
agreement, and by reason of thes·e agreements, the Plaintiff is estopped to deny title of the Defendant to said
mining claims. The District 'Court resolved this issue
in favor of the Plantiff and since no error is p·redicated
upon the Court's decision in this regard, no further
reference will be made to this pleaded estop·pel. (R. 3234)
·The p~rayer of the Defendant's answer and crosscomplaint prayed that title to the said mining claims be
quieted in the Defendant, that the claims of the Plaintiff
be declared to be invalid and of no force and effect whatever, and that Plaintiff be restrained ·and enjoined from
asserting any title to said mining claims and for such
further relief as is meet and equitable in the premises.
(R. '32-34)
'The District Court entered its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decree quieting title in the
Plaintiff to an undivided one-half interest in said mining claims. (R. 14-19) Neither the District Court's Findings of Fact nor Conclusions of Law nor Decree makes
any reference whatsoever to the title to the undivided
one-half interest which was not quieted in the Plaintiff.
The Defendant filed a timely motion to amend the
Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Deeree
which, so far as they are pertinent to this ap})·eal, requested the Court to modify paragraph 3 of said Findings of Fact by setting forth therein that the Defendant..
had not only rendered services in connection with the
acquisition of said mining claims, but that said DefendSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ant had paid out of his own resources toward the purchase price and development of said mining claims the
sum of $16,000.00, and had made, exe.cuted and delivered
to the seller, Howard Balsley, his note in the amount of
$2,250.00, and secured said note with a good and sufficient mortgage upon said mining claims and that the
Plaintiff had contributed only $4,000.00 toward the purchase price and improvements of said mining claims.
That their -contributions were not joint and equal and
that in equity and good conscience, the right, title and
interest of the Plaintiff and of the Defendant, Paterson,
should be quieted in each in proportion to their respe(}tive contributions toward the purchase price and costs
of development of said mining 'claims, or in the alternative, to quiet title to an undivided one-half interest in
the Plaintiff and that Plaintiff pay and contribute to
the Defendant, Paterson, toward the cost of purchase
and development of said mining claims an amount which
would make their respective contributions equal. The
motion further moved the Court to adjust all equities
between the parties to the action and to determine the
status of all controversial claims to or interest in the
properties which are shown to exist in the evidence, regardless of the character. (R. 20-21). This motion was
denied. ( R. 10)
At the trial of the ease, it was stipulated and agreed
hy the Plaintiff and the Defendant, Paterson, that the
lease-hold interest of the Defendants Asa Lloyd Heflin
and Melvin C. Bowles would not be affected by the out-
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come of this litigation and the decree entered by Judge
Keller so recites. :Therefore no further mention will be
made to the interest of said Defendants. (Tr. 3)
During the fall of 1947, Plaintiff and Defendant
entered into an agreement whereby Plaintiff was to
furnish services in the procurement of capital and Defendant was to furnish services in finding, selecting and
acquiring certain mining claims to be purchased and
developed through the capital furnished by Plaintiff.
(R. 17; Tr. 5-6)
In accordance with said agreement, the Plaintiff
procured investors in the vicinity of Kansas City and
Topeka, Kansas, and delivered to the Defendant the
sum of $~9,550.00; that the Defendant exp·ended $37,310.00 for the purchase of certain mining claims situate in
the State qf Colorado and.11 mining claims situate near
Moab, Utah, none of which are involved in this action,
and for expenses incurred in connection with the acquisition and w·ork done on these claims. This evidence is
uncontradicted and the details of these expenditures
are set out in the D·efendant's Exhibit B.
In accordance with said agree~ent, on June 1, 1948,
the Defendant in his individual capacity and as agent
for the Plaintiff entered into an agreement with H. W.
Balsley under the terms of which Mr. Balsley agreed to
sell and the Defendant agreed to buy the mining claims
described in Plaintiff's Complaint for $20,000.00 payable according to the terms and p·rovisions of said agreement. (Defendant's Exhibit C).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Payments were made from time to time to Mr.
Balsley and as of July 14, 1949', there had been paid toward the purchase price of said mining claims the sum
of $15,500.00. On June 15, 1949, the Defendant paid
an additional $2,2'50.00 and at the same time made,
executed and delivered to Mr. Balsley his ~promissory
note in the amount of $2.,250.00 and secured said note
with a mortgage upon said mining claims, so that after
the June 15, 1949 payment, the Defendant had paid
$17,750.00 in cash and had delivered a note and mortgage
to secure the balance of the purchase price to-wit:
$2,250.00. ·Of the $17,750.00 so paid, the Defendant paid
out of his personal funds $13,750.00 and /$4,000.00 out of
a joint fund owned by the Plaintiff and the Defendant in
equal shares so that the actual contribution of the Defendant toward the purchase price of said claims was
$15,750.00 and the contribution of the Plaintiff toward
the purchase of said mining claims was $2,000.00. These
facts are not contradicted and the amount of the various
payments made by the Defendant to Mr. Balsley and the
source of such funds are set out in Defendant's Exhibit

H.

STA'TEMENT OF POINTS
1. ·The District Court erred in the following particulars to-wit :
(a)

In denying the Defendant's motion to amend

its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and De'cree and
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refusing to determine the Defendant's interest in said
mining claims.
(b) In denying the Defendant's motion to amend
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and refusing to
determine the amount of the contributions of the Plaintiff and the Defendant toward the purchase p,rice and
costs of improving· said mining claims.
(c) In denying the Defendant's motion to amend
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions o'f Law and refusing either to quiet title to an undivided one-half interest in the Plaintiff and an undivided one-half interest
in the Defendant and to impose a lien upon said mining
claims to secure the ·payment of contribution by the Plaintiff to the Defendant for such an amount as would make
their contributions equal, or in the alternative, to quiet
the title in the parties in undivided fractional interests
proportioned upon their resp,ective contributions in the
acquisition and development of the claims.
(d) In refusing to adjudicate the relative rights,
obligations and liabilities of the Plaintiff in regard to
the note and mortgage against said mining claims in
favor of said H. W. Balsley.
(e) In refusing to require the Plaintiff to do equity,
and in refusing to make a complete disposition of all
the issues raised by the Complaint, Ansvrer, and CrossComplaint.
2.

The District Court erred in denying the De-

fendant's. motion to amend its Findings of Fact by
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striking from paragraph 2 of said Findings of Fact the
following:
''And that the other half would be finally
transferred to said Corporation and that the
Plaintiff and the Defendant W. C. Paterson would
receive stock for their transfer and other compensation for their services, and that the Plaintiff
and the Defendant W. C. P'aterson would each
own a one-fourth interest in such property so
acquired.''

ARGUMENT
A COURT OF EQUITY SH~OULD NOT ENT.ER AN INCOMPLETE DECREE, BUT SHOULD DECIDE ALL ISSUES
INVOLVED IN THE CONTROVERSY AND AWARD COMPLETE RELIEF AND ACCOMPLISH FULL JUSTICE BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO PREVENT FURTHER LITIGATI·ON.

liu.dlow, et al, vs. Colorado Animal ByProducts Company, Utah 1943 104 Utah
121137 P. (2), 347.
Kinsmam vs. Utah Gas and Coke Company,
Utah, 1918 53 Utah 10: 177 P. 419.
Floor vs. Johnson, Utah, 1948, not reported
199 P. (2) 547.
Stromerson vs. Averill, California, 1942, 121
P. (2) 826; 126 P. (2) 392; 141 P. (2)
732; 1'33 P. (2) 617.
Hu,ltz vs. Taylor, Kansas 1947, 181 P. (2) 515.

Mur'nay Hotel OompaJYIJY vs. Go1lditng et aJ,
New Mexico, 1950, 216 P. (2) 364.
1
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Bacon vs. Wahrhaftig, California, 1950, 218
P. (2) 144.
LaJolla Casa Deman.ana vs. Hopkins, Californi~a, 1950, 219 P. ( 2) 871.
Colombia Trust Ciomp1any vs. Farmers &
Merchants Bnnk, Utah, 1933, 82 Ut'ah
117 22 P. (2) 164.
Conley vs. Sharpe, California, 1943, 136 P.
(2) 376.
Strausburg vs. Connor, California, 19'50, 215
P. (2) 509.
Miller vs. Gillelamd, Colorado, 19'39, 95 P. (2)
815.
Ut~ah Rules of Civil Procedu.re, Rule 54(c) 1.
Rule 54 (c) provides :
"Generally. Excep~t as to a party against
whon1 a judgment is entered by default, every
_ final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled,
even if the party has not demanded such relief
in his pleadings. It may be given for or against
one or more of several claimants; and it may,
when the justice of the case requires it, determine
the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as
between or among themselves.''
In Ludlow vs. Colorado Animal By-Prodtt.cts Compa;ny, supra, suit was brought to enjoin the construction
and operation of the Defendant's Rendering Plant upon
the ground that it consituted a nuisance. The District
Court found that the Plant constituted a nuisance, but in
view of the Plaintiff's delay in seeking relief, no injuncSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion would be granted, but that the Plaintiffs would he
awarded damages for the depreciation of the value of
their property by reason of the maintenance of the
nuisance. Thereafter, a suppJemental Complaint was
filed in which p~arties, as to whom the action had previ·ously been dismissed, were joined as Plaintiffs. Complaint was made that the supplemental pleading is an
action in which there was a mis·joinder of parties Plaintiff, each having a separate cause of action for damages.
The Supreme Court held that it was not error to
permit the suppJemental pleadings, and in its opinion
said:
''In an equity action where the prayer is for
both specific and general relief, such as for an
injunction and 'any further or other relief which
the Court shall deem appropriate in the premises,'
having once acquired jurisdiction of the parties
and the subject matter, the Court will retain that
jurisdiction until full justice has been achieved
between the parties, even if equitable relief is
denied. ·This is especially true in this state where
we have only one form of civil action, and various
kinds of relief can be administered in the same
action.''
In the Floor vs. J ohns,on, supra, suit was brought
by certain stockholders of the New Quincy Mining Comp·any to cancel two hundred thousand shares of stock
which had been issued by the ·Company. By amendment,
the respondent asked for additional relief in the ouster
of the Directors who had been elected by stockholders
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including those representing the two hundred thousand
shares in question.
The Court held that the two hundred thousand
shares of stock had been fraudulently issued, and decreed that the Directors- elected by virtue of the use of
that stock were holding ·office illegally. Comp~laint was
made by the Defendants, that the Court had no authority
to declare the Directors ·who had fraudulently issued the
stock to be illegally elected. In its ·opinion the ·Court said:
''It would be a peculiar kind of justice if the
equity court were only able to say the stock was
fraudulently issued and order its cancellation,
and then be unable to give the complete relief
which would naturally foll·ow, of declaring the
legality or illegality of action pursuant to the
fraudulent issue. Schwab vs. Frisco Mining Milling Co., supra, and cases cited therein. 'The ouster
of the Johnson group and declaration that the
Floor group members were elected is not the
·paramount relief sought. It is only incidental to
the cancellation of stock fraudulently issued, ~and
outstanding. Consolidated Wagon & 1\fachine ·Co.
v. Kay et al., 81 Utah 595, 21 P. 2d 836; ·Trenchard
v. Reay, 70 Utah 19, 257 P. 1046; Kinsman v. Utah
Gas & Coke Co., 53 Utah 10, 177 P. 418. There was
no error in overruling the demurrers and 'Objections rn-ade to inclusion of the additional matters
in the p~rayer for relief."
In Kinsmam vs. The Ubah Gas and Coke Com.p,any,
supra, the C·ourt following the same rule, said:
"The Plaintiffs alleged the depreciation of
both the rental and market value of their homes,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and the court found that such allegations were
supported by the testimony. Plaintiffs prayed for
both specific and general relief, and a court of
equity, having acquired jurisdiction of the parties
and the subject-matter, will retain that jurisdiction until justice has been done between the
parties.
''In addition, in this state there is but one
form of civil action for the enforcement or protection of private rights and for the redress or
prevention of private wrongs, and law and equity
may be administered in the same action. Such
are the provisions of both the Constitution and the
Code. ·To dismiss this action, and send the Plaintiffs to their actions at law, would necessitate the
filing of new complaints based upon and containing the same facts as alleged in the com·plaint
here, and to be presented to the same court, invested with like powers. Such proceedings would
defeat the very object of the Constitutional and
statutory provisions providing for only one form
of civil action, and empowering the court to administer both equity and legal relief in the same
action.''

Strom.erson v. Averill, supra, is a ~ost interesting
and enlightening case. Four times the Superior Court of
California entered a judgment and an ap·peal was taken,
and four times the Supreme Court of ~California held
that the Su:perior Court had not determined all of the
issues involved in the case and had not required the
Defendant to do equity.
In 1936, the Plaintiff entered into a contract with
Miller and Lux, Inc. to purchase 562 acres of land. Pay1
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ments were to be made as set out in the contract over a
period of nine years. The down payment was made
through a loan obtained by the Defendant, most of which
was repaid out of the operations of the farm. The farm
operations were financed ·by advances from the San
Joaquin Cotton 'Oil Company, secured by chattel mortgages on the crops. Such notes and mortgages were
endorsed by the Defendant. Such advances were repaid
chiefly by returns of the crops raised. ·Three bank accounts were maintained and the advances raised from
the San Joaquin Cotton Oil Company were paid into
such of these accounts as the circumstances required.
Plaintiff brought an action to quiet title. Defendant
answered alleging ownership.
The Superior Court of 'California found that the
Plaintiff was working as agent 'Of the Defendant and
quieted title to said real estate in the Defendant. Upon
appeal the Supreme Court of ·California reversed the
Superior Court for failing to determine all of the issues
raised by the pleadings and in failing to require the
Defendant to do equity. In its opinion 133 P. (2') 62.5 the
Court said:
"We agree with Plaintiffs that the Court has
failed to require Defendant to do equity in the
case and further proceedings should be had. The
nature of the action has been heretofore discussed.
Such cases as this should ·not be tried piecemeal.
The entire issue between the parties should be adjusted. As it stands, Stromerson assumed personal liability under the contract to purchase the.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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prop·erty. If Defendant does not discharge the
obligation, it is shouldered upon Stromerson, Defendant's agent. Fur:ther, it appears that there
may be outstanding notes and chattel mortgages
upon which Stromerson is liable in connection
with his conduct as an agent for D·efendant, and
the court made no finding with respect to the
financial obligations, if any, existing between the
parties. As we have seen, the decree determines
that the contract and property belong to Defendant and that Stromerson has no interest therein.
It rests upon theory of agency and a constructive
or resulting trust arising therefrom. There necessarily was implicit in the agency agreement an
agreement upon the part of the Defendant, principal to reimburse the agent Stromerson for any
detriment suffered by him in carrying out his
duties. It is the general rule that unless otherwise
agreed, the princip~al owes a duty to his agent to
reimburse him for or exonerate him from authorized payments by the agent on behalf of the principal, and payments and obligations under contracts
\vhich the agent is authorized _to make himself
liable. Schwarting v. Artle 40 Cal. App. 2d 433,
105 P. 2d 380; Dolman 'Co. Inc. v. Rubber Corporation of America, 109 Cal. App. 353, 293 P. 129;
Restatement Agency 439. It does not appear that
there wa.s ·any agreement between defendant and
Stromerson that the former was not to exonerate
the latter from -or reimburse him for obligations
incurred by the latter on behalf of the former, but
on the contrary the circumstances point to an
implied agreement that such exoneration and
reimbursement would he made. Also, where the
resulting or constructive trustee takes title with
the consent of the beneficiary he is entitled to
reimbursement. ·S~ee Watson v. Poore, supra;
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Robles v. Clarke, 25 ·Cal. 317; Woodard v.
Wright, 82 Cal. 202, 22 P. 1118; Milloglav v.
Zacharias, 33 Cal. App. 561, 165 P. 977. The conduct of Stromerson in giving .his personal credit
on the contract and the crop mortgages was at
the direction of the Defendant, his p~rincip·al. He
may also have rendered services and made expenditures for which he has not been reimbursed.
The trial court should therefore take an accounting, asC€rtain the nature and extent of the outstanding obligations which Stromerson has assumed, the value of any services he has rendered
and the amount of any expenditures he h·as made
in the course of his duties as agent for Defendant including the contract of purchase, and make
such order in the premises as a condition to Defendant's recovery as will protect Plaintiffs from
liability under those obligations and reimburse
them for such services and expenditures if any.
''The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court to take such further
proceedings as may be necessary to determine
what if any obligations Plaintiffs or either of
them have assum·ed as agent OT trustee f·or Defendant, and any amounts due from Defendant to
Plaintiffs or either of them arising out of the
transaction in relation to the acquisition, development or 'Operation of the property involved
in this action, and render judgment accordingly,
making any amount due Plaintiffs a lien upon
Defendant's interest in said property, and providing for the release, discharge and exoneration of
Plaintiffs and each of them from any 'obligations
in connection with the purchase, develop·m·ent or
operation of said property, and thereupon make
a decree quieting Defendant's title to said prop·Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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erty subject to the payment of such lien and the
discharge of said obligations by Defendant.''
·see also 141 P. (2:) 737 where the California Court
. again reversed the Superior Court for failure to determine all of the issues.
A CO-TENANT WHO PAYS T·HE TAXES AGAINST THE
COMMON ESTATE OR MAKES SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS IN THE COMM·ON ESTATE, OR DISCHARGES A
PRIOR AND SUPERIOR ENCUMBRANCE IS ENTITLED TO
CONTRIBUTION FROM THE OTHER CO-TENANTS, AND
T·O A LIEN AGAINST THE COMMON ESTATE TO SECURE
SU,CH ·CONTRIBUTIO·NS.

Hultz v. Taylolf, Kansas 1947, 181 P. (2) 515;
199 P. (2) 52:9; 215 P. (2) 145

Con.ley v. Slvarpe, California, 1943, 13'6 P. (2)
376

Strarusburg v. Co'Yllfl.or, California, 1950, 215
P. (2) 509

In Hultz v. Tay~or, 181 P. (2) 515, the Plaintiff
commenced an action to require the Defendant to convey
to. the Plaintiff 15 acres of a 30 acre tract of land. The
Defendant answered that he was the owner of all said
30 acres and that he was in possession thereof. The -trial
court held that the Plaintiff had not sustained the burden
of proof to his claim of ownership and that the Defendant had not sustained the burden of proof to his claim of
ownership. The Court further held that if a request for
partition was made by either party, the property would
be partitioned and the proceedings of the sale distributed
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according to the contributions of the p~arties, to the costs,
redemption, taxes, interest and incidental. expenses. No
request for partition was made and the court entered
judgment ag-ainst the Plaintiff for costs. Upon appeal
the Supreme C'Ourl of Kansas said:
''From the foregoing facts if will·be seen that
the legal rights of the parties to the action have
been adjudged to remain in complicated, chaotic
confusion. The Plaintiffs do not know whethe·r
they have right to remain in possession of the
house; the Defendant, Hugh Taylor, does not
know whether he has title to all the land as
against the claims of th·e Plaintiffs; no one knows
who should pay taxes on all or any part 'Of the
property.. The Plaintiffs do not know whether
Hugh Taylor owes them money; whether it is a
lien upon the land, or whether they can hereafter
obtain a judgment for the eorrect amount. Thus,
the means to the legal end ended meaningless.
Moreover, serious legal complications may arise
if the respective parties attem~pt to seek an adjudication of their resp·ective rights in subsequent
independent litigation. The law relative to avoiding a multiplicity of actions an·d- res judicata may
plague the parties in any actions which they may
see fit to bring in furtherance of the establishment of their legal rights. We do not pass upon
such questions because they are not befor:e us for
decision in this appeal.
''This court is well a ware that the trial court
was confronted with p;erplexing problems concerning the application of the .statute of frauds, the
effect of part perfo:rmance, possession, and partial payment thereunder, the sufficiency of writSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
ten memoranda, the limitations of the pleadings,
the possible insufficiency of the testimony, and
other complications. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the result reached by the trial court
was wrong. The applicable and controlling rule
is that equity will not enter a p:artial or incomplete decree. From 19 Am. Jur. 12:6-127 the following is quoted :
' ' 'The rule is that equity will not enter a partial or incomplete decree. Having taken cognizance of a cause for any purpose, a court of equity
will ordinarily retain jurisdiction for all purposes; decide all issues which are involved by the
subject matter of the diS'prute between the litigants; award relief which is .complete and finally
disposes of litigation so as to make performance
of the -court's decree perfectly safe to those who
may be compelled to 'Obey it; accomplish full
justice between the parties litigant; and prevent
future litigation.'
"L-ater in the text will be found the following
from Section 409, page 281:
" 'It is a fundamental principle of chancery
, courts finally to dispose of litigation, making as
c10mplete a decision ·on all the points embraced in
a cause as the nature of the case will admit, so 'to
preclude not only all furthe·r litigations between
the same parties, but also the possibility that the
parties may at any future :period be disturbed or
harassed by the claim of any other person, as well
as the possibility 'Of any danger of injustice being
done to other p·ersons who are not before the
court in the p~resent proceedings. Acting pursuant
to this principle, courts of equity require not only
that the pleadings shall S'O p·resent all the rna tters
in controversy that they may be properly adjudi-
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cated, but also, that so far as p·racti,cable, all p,e·rsons having any interest in the subject matter of
controversy be made parties to the end that their
rights may be ascertained.'
"The text continues:

'' '* * * A final decree which undertakes to
dispose of the ~whole cause should include a disposition of issues which are raised by a cross hill
and answer as well as those which are p~resented
by the pleadings in chief.
'' 'Whe're several parties, being all those interested in a legal controversy, are before the
court asking that their respective rights he determined, and such rights are capable of ascertainment, a decree, based upon indefinite findings,
which does not determine the essential rights of
all the parties and leaves a material part of the
controversy undetermined, is insufficient and will
not be upheld on appeal.' ('S. 409, p. 282.)
"Equity maxims support the rule. One of
them is that 'Equity delights to do justice and not
by halves.' Another is that 'equity will not suffer
a wrong to be without a remedy.' See' C.J.S:.,
Equity, 104 and 105, p. 506. The rule which we
think controlling this ca.se is stated and will he
found supported by nearly four pages of citations in 30 C.J.S., Equity, 67, beginning at p~age
414."
When the case was again before the Sup·erior Court,
the Court misinterpreted the opinion of the Supreme
C~ourt

of Kansas and ordered the 30 acres to be appraised

and if neither party ·elected to take it at the appraised
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value, it should he sold and the pro:cee'ds paid as set out
in the opinion.
Upon appeal the Supreme Court of Kansas held
that since there ·was no dispute as to the title to the North
15 acres, it was error to 'order the sale of the e;ntire 30
acre tract. See 199 P. (2') 529.
Again when the case was r·emanded to the Superior
Court, that Court drew the following conclusions:
III. "In view, however, of the finding and judgment of the Supreme Court as expressed in next
to the last paragraph of its opinion in the case of
Hultz v. Taylor, 166 Kan. 55 (199 P. 2d 529), that
the defendant Taylor is the owner of the North
Fifteen Acres of the Thirty Acre Tract in question, and that the plaintiff, Hultz, has no interest
therein because of the allegations in his petitio;,
equity, unde·r the Conclusion of Fact in this case,
and the Mandate of the Supreme Court, will
award the title to the South Fifteen Acres of the
Tliirty Acre ·Tract to the parties who contributed
to the redemption of the whole 'Thirty Acre
Tract."
IV. "Equity will, in this action, de:cree a division of the South Fifteen Acres of the Thirty Acre
Tract among the parties who contributed to the
redemption thereof, from the foreclosure sale, if
either of the parties move for such a division
within sixty days from the entry of the judgment
herein.''
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Again the case was appealed to the Supreme 'Court,
and that Court referring to the conclusions of the Court
set out above, said:

'' vVe set aside conclusions of law Nos. III and
I' as not being in accord with the trial court's
judgment.
7

''In lief thereof the court should find the
fractional share of the thirty-acre tract of land
owned by Caleb Hultz and the fractional share
owned by Hugh Taylor. Whether that is done by
permitting and requiring Hultz· to pay Taylor a
sum which the court shall find will make each of
the parties the owner of an undivided one-half of
the land, or whether such respective shares are
determined by the am·ount each has p~aid to redeem the land plus taxes and other itenis, if any,
which should be taken into account, is for the trial
court to determine under all the facts and circumstances in the case.''
In Conley v. Sharp.e, supra, Plaintiffs commenced an
action to set aside certain deeds and quiet title to the
real estate in question in Plaintiffs. The Defendant's
answer set up an undivided one-half interest in D·efendant. The District Court held that the Plaintiffs an·d the
Defendant owned the real estate as tenants in common,
and found that the Defendant had made ce:rtain payments
of principal and interest due on a mortgage, had p·aid the
taxes on the property, and had p•aid for material and
labor repairing and preserving said real property. Upon
appeal, addressing itself to the question of whether a
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co-tenant sh·ould be reimbursed for such expenditures,
the Appellate Court said:
''The rule is that when one tenant in common
, has ·paid a debt or obligation for the benefit of the
joint property, or has discharged a lien or assessment imposed upon it as a common burden, he is
entitled as a matter of right to have his co-tenant,
who has received the benefit of it, refund to him
his proportionate share of the amount paid. As a
matter of fact this property was joint p·roperty
when these taxes and other charges against it were
paid by plaintiff. In proportion to their interest
all tenants in common are in duty bound to pay
taxes, which in thi.s state are a lien upon real
property and their nonpayment subjects the land
to sale in satisfaction of them. Either of the cotenants may pay the taxes assessed against the
whole estate, and such payment discharges the
·lien imposed upon the common interest, and no
matter whether one tenant p'aying it intended the
payment to be f·or his own benefit or not, such
payment in fact and in law essentially insures to
the benefit of the other co-tenants. It discharges
the lien against the common estate for the common
benefit, independent of any intention of the coten_ant paying it, and as all other co-tenants are
entitled to the benefit of such payment, it is only
right that they should refund to the one making it
their prO'portion of the amount he has paid.
Starks v. Kirchgarber, 134 Mo. Ap·p. 211, 11'3 S.W.
1149. This rule equally applies to expenditures
. "
other than taxes made for the common bene f It.
Willmon v. Koyer, 1'68 Cal. 369, 374, 143 P. 694,
. 69 6, L.R.A. 1915 B, 961. See also, Rich v. Smith,
26 Cal. App·. 775, 784, 148 P. 545; J a1nison v. C·otton, 136 Cal. App. 127, 129, 28 p·. 2d 39.
1
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Respondents admit they have ''been unable to
find any authority holding the co-tenant p~erson
ally liable for the expenses incurred by the other
co-tenant and, theref·ore, (have) no objection to
the modification of the judgment entered in the
above-entitled action so that the judgment only
constitute a lien on the real property and not a
personal judgment against the plaintiffs and
cross-defendants.''
In the Strausburg v. Conrnor, supra, action was
brought to quiet title to certain real estate. The court
found that the Plaintiff was the owner of an undivided
three-fourths interest and the Defendant the owner of an
undivided one-fourth interest and the eourt also found
that the Defendant owed to Strausburg, one of the
Plaintiffs, a balance due on the ~purchase price of the
Defendant's one-fourth interest and entered a judgment
accordingly. Referring to this phase of the case, the
Appellate Court held:
I

"Little need be said about the ap·peal from
the part of the judgment ·wherein it is decreed
that respondent Mike Strausburg recover of ap·pellant the sum of $20. This was, upon sufficient
evidence, held by the court to have been the unpaid part ·of the purchase pric·e which appellant
had agreed to pay .for the Strausburg interest.
Appellant by appropriate affirmative alle·gations
had sought a decre·e quieting her title against the
·Strausburgs, basing her claim entirely on their
deed to her. Therefore the trial court was justified, while granting her the equitable relief she
asked in ordering her to do equity by paying her
debt."
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It will be recalled that the Plaintiff commenced this
action to quiet title to a one-half undivided interest in the
mining claims in question; that the Defandant 's answer
alleged that he owned the mining claims, and. was entitled
to the possession thereof; that during the trial the evidence showed conclusively that the Defendant's contribution toward the purchase price of said mining claims
was $15,750.00, and that_ the Plaintiff's contribution was
$·2,000.00 ; that there is now a mortgage against said mining claims in favor of W. H. Balsley given to secure the
balance of the purchase price due. It will also be recalled
that the Defendant's motion to amend the Findings of
Fact, ·Con;clusions of Law and Decree requested the court
to quiet title in the Plaintiff and Defendant according
to their respective contributions, .or to quiet title to an
undivided one-half interest in the Plaintiff and impose
a lien on said mining claims in favor of .the D·efendant
to secure the amount owing from Plaintiff to Defendant;
and that the court determine and adjust all equities between the parties and determine all controversial claims
to the properties, and that said motion was denied.
We respectfully sub-mit that under the authorities
ab-ove cited, the District Court erred in failing to determine what right, title and interest the Defendant had in
said mining claims; in failing to determine the respective
contributions toward the purchase pri_ce and improvements of the Plaintiff and the Defendant, and in failing
to impose a lien in favor of Defendant to secure the
amount of the contribution due from Plaintiff, and in
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failing to determine 'vhether the Plaintiff and Defendant, or both of them, should pay to H. W. Balsley the
balance due on the present existing note and mortgage.
The absolute necessity of the Cuu.rt to completely
detennine all of the issues in the case becomes of the
greatest importance, if it is kept in mind that the Court's
failure to decide the issues involved in the case p~reelude
all partie&from thereafter predicating a cause of action
upon an undecided issue because the judgment is res
adjudicata, not only ~as to the issues determined by the
Court, but as to all issues which should have been determined by the Court. The rule is thus stated in 44 American Jurisprudence at Page 9-5:
''Generally, where jurisdictional requisites
are satisfied, the judgment or decree is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their
privies \vith respect to all matters in issue which
were or should have been determined, in the action
or proceeding, ~and, under the rule of res adjudicata, bars subsequent litigation between such. persons based on the same claim or cause of action. To
a determination 'Of ~all interests, in addition to
jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject
matter of the action, it is necessary to the validity
and binding effect of a judgment or decree that
the court should have had jurisdiction of the question which it assumes to decide, or the ~particular
remedy or relief which it assumes to grant, but
if all the parties are brought before the court that
can be brought before it, and it acts properly according to the rights that ap~pear, there being no
fraud or collusion, its decision-is c.onclusive as to
to the state of the title."
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See also, Hultz v. Taylor, supra, and C:onley v.
Sharpe, supra, when the court recognized the rule that
one co-tenant cannot recover a personal judgment against
the other tenant for taxes paid, improvements made or
discharging a superior encumbrance. Unless this case
.is reversed and p1aintiff is required to do equity and a
lien impressed to protect the Defendant, the Defendant
may he without a remedy and Plaintiff unjustly enriched.
·see also Logam ~City v. Utah Pow·er and Light Company, 16 P. (2) 1097, 1101 where this Court held that a
judgment is conclusive as to all matters which might
have been interposed as a defense. An affirmance of the
District Court's decision would ·prevent the Defendant
from seeking relief against the Plaintiff fo! the an1ount
owing from Plaintiff to Defendant in another action.
The necessity and advisability of the Court to completely decide all of the issues in this case and to enter a
Decree which will fully and completely protect all of
the rights and equities of all of the parties concerned is
unmistakably demonstrated by the fact that on the 8th
of August, 1950, there was recorded in the office of the
San Juan County Recorder a deed conveying all of the
Plaintiff's interests in the mining claims described in the
Plaintiff's Complaint to Alvin J. Kinder.
Referring now to the Defendant's second assignment
of error, namely, that the C·ourt 's Findings of Fact
should not have included a finding that the Defendant
had agreed to transfer his interest in said mining claims
to a corporation to be organized, we desire to point out
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to the Court that such a finding is wholly without any
of the issues raised by the pleadings in this case, and
wholly unnecessary to an adjudication of the respective
rights of the Plaintiff and the Defendant in said mining
claims, and should be deleted from the Court's Findings
of Fact.
· We respectfully submit that the decision of the
District ·Court should be reversed and remanded to the
District Court with instructions to determine all of the
issues raised by the pleadings and to enter Findin~gs of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree adjudicating the
rights of the Defendant to an undivided one-half interest
in said mining claims; determining the contributions
of the Plantiff and the Defendant toward the purchase
price of said mining claims and the improvements made
thereon, and impressing a lien in favor of the Defendant
to secure the indebtedness owing to him from the Plaintiff and to determine the respective rights, liabilities and
obligations of the Plaintiff and the Defendant in regards to the mortgage indebtedness in favor of H. W.
Balsley.
Respectfully submitted,
EMERS·ON C. WILLEY
WESLEY G. HO·WELL
·Suite 1003-07 Boston Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah

Atvorneys for D~efendant
&i A·ppell~ants
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